R (on the application of Rizvi) v HM Assistant Coroner for South London
[2025] EWHC 3014 (Admin)
Summary
In an inquest where Article 2 issues are live, there are generally two opportunities to make submissions on the issue. The first is prior to the Inquest, often at a pre-inquest review, where the coroner is determining whether or not Article 2 is ‘engaged’ for the purposes of the inquest. The second is when making submissions on conclusions, and whether there is sufficient evidence for an issue to go before a jury.
As the case of Rizvi ably demonstrates, the questions to be asked at each stage are different. At the pre-inquest stage, the question is ‘is there an arguable breach?’ whereas at the conclusions stage, the question is ‘is there sufficient evidence of a breach on which to make a finding?’. The result is that there may be many cases which engage Article 2, but which do not require issues relating to breach to go before the jury.
The Facts
Sabina Rizvi had attended the police station at Bexleyheath Police Station in relation to an ongoing investigation for a stolen car. Her attendance was to provide documentation to the police in relation to her ownership of the car itself.
Her partner, Mark Williams, also attended the police station. Concerns were raised at the time as he attended wearing a police issue bullet proof vest, claiming that he had to wear it due to fear of injury.
When leaving the police station in the early hours of the morning, the couple were both shot. This resulted in the death of Sabina Rizvi whilst Mark Williams sustained a brain injury. Although the gunmen were never identified, Paul Asbury would go on to be convicted for his part in arranging the killing.
Whilst the inquest was originally suspended pending the criminal investigation, it was later resumed, and would look at whether any acts or omissions of police officers had caused or contributed to the death. It was further decided that the inquest engaged Article 2, on the basis that it was arguable that the police had breached their operational duty (based on the duty established in Osman v UK).
At the conclusion of the evidence the coroner, assisted by Counsel to the Inquest, identified six factual questions relevant to the question of whether there was sufficient evidence of a breach of the police’s operational duty under Article 2:
a) There was a risk to the life of Ms Rizvi.
b) The risk was real and immediate (and, in this context, was a risk of murderous attack occurring shortly after Mark Williams and Ms Rizvi left the police station).
c) The risk came from Paul Asbury and his associates.
d) The police were or ought to have been aware of (a) to (c).
e) There were steps that the police could reasonably have been expected to take to prevent the risk from materialising.
f) The police failed to take those steps.
Ultimately, the coroner concluded that while there was sufficient evidence of a real and immediate threat, there was insufficient evidence of whether that threat was or ought to have been known to the police, and insufficient evidence as to steps the police could reasonably have been expected to take to prevent the risk from materialising.
On that basis, the coroner did not leave the issue of causative acts or omissions on the part of the police to the jury.
The Judicial Review Challenge
Although the application failed at the first hurdle due to being out of time, Foxton J went on to consider the merits.
There were two grounds of review:
- The Coroner erred in law by determining the matters to be left to the jury according to whether there was sufficient evidence that the substantive Article 2 ECHR duty had been breached, rather than whether such a breach was arguable, and added an unnecessary and impermissible gloss to the threshold for assessing whether such a breach had occurred or was arguable.
- The Coroner erred in law by eliding the question of whether there had been a breach of the substantive Article 2 duty with that of whether there was sufficient evidence that there were any acts or omissions by the police that were potentially causative of Sabina’s death and which could be safely left to the jury.
As to the first ground, Foxton J found that the coroner had applied the correct test. By time it came to consider what matters should be left to the jury, “the issue for the Coroner was not one of arguability, but of evidential sufficiency applying the Galbraith test.” The question of arguability “was relevant to the issue of what type of inquest (Article 2 or Jamieson) was required to discharge the procedural Article 2 duty, but by the end of the evidence, matters had moved beyond that issue.”
As to the second ground, the Claimant (Mrs Rizvi) had sought to argue that there were potentially causative acts or omissions outside the Article 2 duty that the Coroner had disregarded. However Foxton J concluded that “The Coroner did not leave issues of causation to the Jury because she had addressed the alleged acts or omissions of the Police which it was said were open on the evidence, and concluded that none passed the Galbraith test.”
Conclusion
Rizvi is likely to be a useful authority for those representing public bodies where Article 2 has been found to be engaged for the purposes of the inquest, but where it is argued that the evidence does not establish an Article 2 breach.
It is not uncommon for the evidential thresholds for the different stages to become confused, and while this authority does not break any new ground, it provides a helpful reminder of the relevant principles, and an up-to-date judicial steer as to how those principles should be applied.
